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Abstract  Smallpox eradication in South Asia was
a result of the efforts of many grades of health-
workers. Working from within the confines of in-
ternational organisations and government struc-
tures, the role of the field officials, who were of
various nationalities and also drawn from the cit-
ies and rural enclaves of the countries in these
regions, was crucial to the development and de-
ployment of policies. However, the role of these
personnel is often downplayed in official histories
and academic histories, which highlight instead
the roles played by a handful of senior officials
within the World Health Organization and the
federal governments in the sub-continent. This
article attempts to provide a more rounded assess-
ment of the complex situation in the field. In this
regard, an effort is made to underline the great
usefulness of the operational flexibility displayed
by field officers, wherein lessons learnt in the field
were made an integral part of deploying local cam-
paigns; careful engagement with the communities
being targeted, as well as the employment of short
term workers from amongst them, was an impor-
tant feature of this work.
Key words  Smallpox eradication, World Health
Organization, South East Asia Regional Office of
the World Health Organization, Vaccination,
Immunisation
Resumo  A erradicação da varíola no Sul da
Ásia resultou dos múltiplos esforços de trabalha-
dores da saúde de vários níveis. Trabalhando a
partir do interior de organizações internacio-
nais e estruturas governamentais, o papel dos fun-
cionários de campo, originários de várias nacio-
nalidades e também provenientes de cidades e
enclaves rurais dos países dessas regiões, foi cru-
cial para o desenvolvimento e a distribuição de
planos de ação. Entretanto, o papel desses funci-
onários é geralmente minimizado em histórias
oficiais e acadêmicas que ressaltam, ao invés, os
papéis desempenhados por um reduzido número
de funcionários seniores dentro da Organização
Mundial da Saúde e dos governos federais do sub-
continente. Este artigo busca oferecer uma ava-
liação mais integral da complexa situação da er-
radicação da varíola. Nesse sentido, faz-se um
esforço para sublinhar a grande utilidade da fle-
xibilidade operacional apresentada pelos funcio-
nários de campo, na qual as lições aprendidas no
trabalho de campo tornaram-se parte integran-
te da distribuição de campanhas locais. Uma
importante característica foi o cuidadoso enga-
jamento com as comunidades-alvo, bem como a
contratação por curtos períodos de pessoal dessas
mesmas comunidades.
Palavras-chave  Erradicação da varíola, Orga-
nização Mundial de Saúde, Escritório Regional
do Sudeste Asiático da Organização Mundial de
Saúde, Vacinação, Imunização
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Introduction
The global eradication of smallpox was certified
by an independent committee of experts in De-
cember 1979 and the announcement was ratified
by the World Health Organization [hereafter,
WHO] in 1980. Widely hailed as one of the big-
gest medical triumphs of the 20th century, the cam-
paign to eradicate smallpox worldwide is often
described in simplistic terms in official published
histories and in some academic work. The pic-
ture presented is of a unitary programme of ac-
tion, where the many cogs in the wheel apparent-
ly worked in almost perfect harmony, causing
orders from the top of an administrative pyra-
mid to be unquestioningly implemented in local-
ities across the globe. Viewed from this perspec-
tive, the beliefs and calculations of a few senior
officials is supposed to have had informed the
actions of a huge number of health workers of
different educational backgrounds, nationalities,
political affiliations and gender, over the course
of more than a decade1-3.
This article seeks to show that the organised
drive to expunge smallpox was a much more
complicated and disjointed entity. A composite
of numerous multi-faceted country- and region-
oriented public health programmes, the cam-
paign combined the work of several non-gov-
ernment agencies with that of national, provin-
cial and district administrations. This ensured
the participation of a wide range of health work-
ers, with distinctive educational and training back-
grounds, with varying levels of loyalty to differ-
ent government departments and political cul-
tures, and, perhaps most significantly, with well-
developed notions about the efficacy of specific
medical traditions and practices. It is, therefore,
unsurprising that a careful assessment of unpub-
lished WHO papers reveals that collaborations
between senior organization staff, in the WHO
offices and field postings, involved a series of time-
consuming negotiations with numerous grades
of funding agencies, bureaucrats, politicians and,
not least, health workers. This, in turn, resulted
in complex administrative and financial arrange-
ments that needed to be re-established at frequent
intervals. At one level, this was a situation caused
by the fact that inter- and intra-governmental
discussions and the resulting aid packages, which
were to prove decisive to the successful comple-
tion of smallpox eradication, were organised on
varying bi-lateral and multi-lateral bases. It is
worth remembering here that WHO officials were
generally involved in multi-lateral negotiations,
as initiators of negotiations, witnesses to the com-
pletion of signed agreements and, sometimes,
apolitical distributors of resources in the shape
of vaccine, vaccinating kits, money and person-
nel. At another level, the continual re-negotiation
of working relations was a direct result of the
highly complicated nature of the health workers’
cadre. Whilst some elements of this work-force
were supportive of the WHO’s call for global
smallpox eradication, others were either apathetic
or openly hostile – skill and apathy were required
to tackle such apathy and hostility, and this arti-
cle will seek to demonstrate that success was not
was not always easily or completely achieved.
Indeed, a detailed examination of these trends
reveals that senior WHO officials and field repre-
sentatives were often not in control of the unfold-
ing of policy imperatives, as a variety of interna-
tional, regional, national and local developments
continually threatened to blow the most tightly
planned plans off course. Projects often stuttered
along uncharted paths, as their managers were
constantly forced to adapt to unexpected prob-
lems. As a result, desired results were frequently
achieved almost accidentally, surprising even the
most optimistic and committed field personnel.
An appreciation of all these complexities, which
are repeatedly glossed over in available scholarly
work on the topic, does not detract from the sig-
nificance of the smallpox eradication. To the con-
trary, it highlights the enormity of the achieve-
ment, which many officials and politicians con-
sidered impossible during the 1960s and 1970s.
A short note on the administrative
complexity of the WHO
The United Nations came into being soon after
the end of the Second World War, and the World
Health Organization was established as one of
its major, specialised sections in 1948. The WHO
headquarters were established in Geneva, Swit-
zerland, and this body took on the role of trying
to help in the development and co-ordination of
public health and medical schemes across the
globe. In its formative years, these activities were
targeted particularly at regions that had been
badly affected by the war and countries that had
managed to break loose from the shackles of co-
lonialism; the advertised goal was to carry out all
this work on an apolitical basis4.
The WHO has, from its inception, been a
complex administrative structure. It consists of a
Health Assembly, a Director General’s office that
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is in regular touch with a relatively tightly knit
advisory committee and, not least, a large secre-
tariat. The Assembly was formed by representa-
tives of all the member nations, who met at reg-
ular intervals in Geneva and involved themselves
in proposing schemes and voting for their imple-
mentation. This body was given the power,
through the WHO constitution, to ask the DG’s
office and his/her advisory committee to develop
detailed plans for the implementation of policies
and programmes; all completed plans were then
presented to the assembly and then forwarded
to the secretariat’s bureaucracy for implementa-
tion. This, in turn, ensured the formulation of
numerous plans within the WHO HQ and the
various WHO regional offices, as workers asso-
ciated with these bodies, with varying training,
specialisation and institutional affiliation, fre-
quently came up with varying ideas about how
best to achieve different goals5.
To add to the complexity of what was really
the first stage of policy implementation, depart-
ments within the different WHO offices would
also often set up – on a collaborative basis or
otherwise – specialist research groups to provide
blueprints for action. These suggestions, which
were often published as so-called technical reports,
did not automatically become ordained as WHO
blanket policy; instead, organisational represen-
tatives in the field were often directed by WHO
office managers to give greater attention to some
proposals than others, as a variety of political and
economic considerations had to be made part of
the larger calculations of designing and imple-
menting policy. A further layer of operational com-
plexity was added by the experiences of field per-
sonnel, who had to work in a variety of regional,
national and local contexts. Indeed, as these offi-
cials – of separate nationalities, races, gender and
educational profile – adapted to a variety of polit-
ical, economic, social and medical situations, they
were forced to reinterpret centrally dictated poli-
cies in numerous ways. In doing this, it is striking
that WHO field officials were continually forced,
sometimes to their displeasure, to draw upon lo-
cal sources of information and help. This assis-
tance was generally sought from amongst local
political structures and sections of the social
groups at whom public health policies were being
targeted; this local knowledge and the resultant
activities were, of course, not always in concert, as
varying interests competed for recognition and
precedence, adding several layers of operational
complexity to the unfolding of public health and
medical campaigns6.
It is worth noting here that all the WHO re-
gional offices, their departments and the country
representatives within them were important ac-
tors in the formulation and implementation of
policy in the field, which has been ignored in most
academic studies that tend generally to focus on
either the voices of a handful of people based in
Geneva or the Health Assembly’s resolutions
published by the WHO HQ after several rounds
of careful editing. This also perhaps explains why
the significant voices of national- and local-level
health workers, usually employed by different
WHO offices on short-term contracts of varying
lengths, is almost entirely lost in historical writ-
ings dealing with different health campaigns. This
is, needless to say, a serious lacuna, as the opin-
ions and actions of such staff, who were usually
in touch with local politicians and bureaucrats,
acting as crucial go-betweens between them and
a range international WHO workers on a day to
day basis, are a crucial element of the history of
the unfolding of projects sponsored, managed
or encouraged by the WHO HQ and the regional
offices. Getting access to these significant voices
is difficult, requiring concerted work in a variety
of archives as well as a willingness to chase down
personal papers and talk to WHO workers of all
grades (sometimes in languages other than En-
glish). However, such difficulties should not be
used by historians as a justification for the prep-
aration of blinkered studies that deny agency to
all but a handful of senior WHO administrators.
The uneven progress of the Indian
national smallpox eradication programme
Indian independence from British rule in 1947
brought forth countless hopes of widespread re-
form. The issue of the general improvement of
health conditions occupied a central place in dis-
cussions within government and outside, not least
as it was seen by many commentators to be a
necessary basis of social and economic empow-
erment. Despite the existence of many views and
prescriptions in this regard, India’s first govern-
ment, led by prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru,
chose to back a blueprint of reform proposed by
Sir Joseph Bhore. The so-called Bhore Report
recommended a thorough re-organisation of
health services aimed at a thorough unification
of preventative and curative medicine, through
the gradual development of a cadre of multi-pur-
pose health workers7.
Implementing Bhore’s recommendations was
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always going to be an uphill battle. Ordered by
the colonial authorities during the Second World
War, the report was released as British India was
in the act of being dismantled with a degree of
confusion, just prior to the territory being con-
verted into the independent nations of India and
Pakistan8. The post-colonial division of resourc-
es and territory, and the war over Kashmir that
attended territorial disputes in this regard, en-
sured that scarce resources were denied to the
expansion of general health services6. The strate-
gy of the federal authorities in the face of such a
resource crunch, which prevented the wholesale
development of a new cadre of health workers,
was an advocacy for the re-training of existing
core staff, involved in all manner of public health
and general medical campaigns in the different
Indian states9.
However, this order was easier to design on
paper than actually implement in the field. Sever-
al factors impeded the suggested re-training and
conversion of those involved in specialised jobs
into multi-purpose health workers. General
health policy, according to the new Indian consti-
tution, was controlled by democratically elected
state governments; Nehru and Amrit Kaur, In-
dia’s first federal health minister, appear, in the
first ten years after independence, to have largely
respected this constitutional injunction (the fed-
eral health authority did, however, frequently
apply its right to intervene across state territories
during epidemic outbreaks of infectious disease).
These administrative arrangements proved sig-
nificant in a situation where the federal and state
governments’ visions of reform rarely coalesced
in the face of continuing shortage of financial
resources, as well as differing political, social and
economic goals6,9.
Marked regional variations in healthcare re-
sulted over the decade after 1947, as state govern-
ments drew up their own budgets and means of
allocating them. These, increasingly, became hos-
tage to a variety of electoral considerations and,
in numerous cases, bureaucratic quagmires that
allowed for the official misuse of available funds.
Needless to say, some states – and localities with-
in them – were more affected by these structural
problems than others, but the prevalence of these
trends just increased the uneven nature of the
access to health services across the country9,10.
Further complications were created for health
managers by the politicization of the cadres. This
influenced work in myriad ways – even in states
and localities where managers wanted to push
through re-training regimes, unionisation of the
groups of health workers slowed these efforts,
changed plans beyond recognition or sometimes
even blocked planned re-organisations. The ne-
gotiations between government agencies and the
smallpox workers’ unions were a representative
example. As the federal authorities – and their
supporters within state administrations – made
increased efforts to broaden the responsibilities
of smallpox vaccinators, their union representa-
tives successfully placed stringent demands in
relation to salary and pension rights before re-
training schemes were attempted. However, in-
creased wage bills caused budgetary shortfalls for
almost every state, which, ironically, caused a scal-
ing back of several programmes, including those
intended to train smallpox vaccinators to carry
out a range of other health-related work11-14.
This was the background against which dis-
cussions about the possibility of eradication of
smallpox were started between the Indian federal
authorities and the WHO headquarters in Gene-
va15. From the very outset, there clear indications
that these negotiations would not be carried out
easily. Apart from disagreements about the de-
sign and implementation of policy between the
WHO HQ and the WHO’s South East Asia Re-
gional Office [hereafter, WHO SEARO], it was
clear that the Indian health ministry was far from
united in its support for a programme that might
potentially expunge variola from the country. To
complicate matters, WHO HQ and WHO SEA-
RO representatives in touch with officials in New
Delhi realised that the federal ministry was un-
willing – and in many instances, unable – to dic-
tate the form day to day work was to take to
different state authorities. Apart from being a
result of the fragmentation of political and bu-
reaucratic opinion at different elements of Indian
administration, investigations revealed that seri-
ous difficulties were also being caused by the wide
variation in education and training of workers
who were going to make the scheme possible15,16.
Indeed, it is in the context of this federal gov-
ernment assessment that the regional variations
in the size, structure and quality of the state health
services, which caused some Indian officials sup-
portive of the development of a push to eradicate
smallpox to highlight the dangers of developing
a unified strategy for the entire country. Whilst
their concerns appear to have been ignored for
the most of the 1960s, the wisdom of their warn-
ings became quickly obvious as the so-called ‘pi-
lot projects’ hit the buffers almost in every state.
Assessments of field experience showed that vac-
cination targets were missed, budgets were over-
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shot and the return of smallpox in epidemic form
was not halted. Most importantly, reports re-
vealed that federally dictated policies, at this time
only partially based on recommendations re-
ceived from the WHO HQ, were being reinter-
preted in myriad ways by health workers posted
in the field, in response to a plethora of technical,
political, social and economic conditions. Nota-
bly, assessments of the situation noted that local
public health and medical workers would fre-
quently refuse to give the goal of mass smallpox
vaccination the importance desired by some peo-
ple in New Delhi; thus, many continued to con-
centrate on their day to day responsibilities, after
setting their own priorities in relation to the allo-
cation of resources and time6,17.
The continuation of these trends brought
forth significant reforms in 1967, both within the
WHO offices and Indian government. The WHO
HQ on its part acknowledged the need to invest
greater financial resources in the Indian smallpox
eradication programme, as interest within the
country’s federal government was beginning to
flag. The promise of the infusion of money, stocks
of vaccine and personnel ensured continued Indi-
an participation and even sparked a re-shuffle of
personnel in New Delhi – the Director General of
Health Services was replaced by a person who, at
least in the view of WHO officials, was likely to be
more co-operative. Yet, these changes did not bring
an immediate improvement in vaccinal coverage
and results. To the contrary, it created more con-
cerns, as reports prepared by foreign officials, who
were given Indian government clearance to tour
the country and inspect programme being run in
various states, highlighted the many problems
afflicting the campaign18.
By 1970, it was also clear that local health
workers, of different specialisations, attachments
and ranks, were by no means united in wanting
to support the drive to eliminate variola. If any-
thing, touring international and Indian epidemi-
ologists and vaccinators encountered hostility
from local health officials, who resented the in-
creased supervision of their activities. This af-
fected work negatively in several ways. Many lo-
cal health workers would frequently refuse to
adopt new working methods in relation to search-
ing, reporting and isolating smallpox cases, as
well as new vaccinating methods. This was high-
lighted in the continued use of mass vaccination
techniques in several localities, whenever pressure
was imposed on their public health officials to
assist the national smallpox eradication pro-
gramme. Such a situation was, needless to say, in
stark contrast to the strategy of search and con-
tainment strategy widely prescribed from within
the WHO offices in Geneva and New Delhi, which
hoped to encourage contact tracing and selective
vaccinations within a set of prescribed distances.
It is important in this regard to recognise opera-
tional disunities amongst staff deployed by the
WHO in the field, in a scenario continued to be-
lieve in the usefulness of mass vaccination and
disagreements persisted about the required geo-
graphical scope of the immunisation of popula-
tions surrounding cases of smallpox. These
trends engendered wide variations in beliefs and
actions amongst health workers across the mul-
titude of localities that formed the Republic of
India; whilst some displayed varying levels of
willingness to assist the eradication campaign,
others displayed outright hostility by tapping into
political and social discontentment about aspects
of the programme19.
All these trends had a deep-seated impact on
WHO-funded activities in the country in the
1970s. The unevenness of assistance provided by
Indian health workers posted in the localities en-
couraged the smallpox eradication team based
within WHO SEARO to work with their allies in
Indian government to develop a quasi-indepen-
dent workforce that would carry out inspections
and any required vaccination within problems
spots in different states. Based on an amalgam
of international workers, Indian officials second-
ed from federal, state and district governments,
medical students from across the country and,
not least, people drawn from sub-divisional
towns and villages where work was to be carried
out, this team started working largely indepen-
dently of public health and medical personnel
employed by the state. State support was lobbied
– and sometimes demanded through the Indian
prime minister’s office – when a crisis was identi-
fied, and forcible immunisation was considered
to be a possibility during detailed searches of ur-
ban and rural hamlets in a region. The use of
force in the South Asian smallpox eradication
campaigns has been treated brilliantly by Paul
Greenough; he does, however, downplay the lev-
el of national participation in these campaigns
and the role of WHO officials in mobilising such
support20,21.
The work of this new multi-national and
multi-talented workforce, which was developed
as tough and unexpected lessons were learnt in
the field, was crucial to making Indian smallpox
free; in fact, the knowledge provided by mem-
bers of local communities was integral to this
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success, as it allowed touring teams to be flexible
in meaningful ways. Several commentators have
underlined the great significance of the opera-
tional flexibility displayed by teams of interna-
tional and Indian workers in the field; of greater
import, perhaps, was the collection and collation
of local information, provided by committed al-
lies drawn from areas where intensive search,
containment and immunisation programmes
were carried out22-23.
WHO agencies and smallpox eradication:
Some generalisations
The relatively small number of WHO officials
who started discussing the prospects for the glo-
bal eradication of smallpox in the early 1960s
very much hoped that it would be a top down
campaign, wherein the WHO HQ in Geneva –
and, particularly, some departments within it –
would be able to set a general campaign agenda.
Recommendations were, for instance, volun-
teered in relation to how immunisation might be
carried out, what sort of vaccines to use and how
to assess the achievement of eradication. How-
ever, their experience quickly revealed the pitfalls
of believing that they could automatically assume
such intellectual and technical leadership. Repre-
sentatives within the WHO regional offices raised
numerous queries about proposals sent in from
Geneva, and highlighted their own firmly held
belief that all central directives would require tai-
loring to fit local conditions. These features of
‘locality’ were presented as being both challeng-
ing and inconstant, which, in turn, it was argued,
meant that programme implementation would
require frequent re-jigging, as political arrange-
ments with different national governments were
set up, reconfigured or abandoned.
Significantly, as we have seen earlier, there were
disagreements, too, at other administrative levels
about how a global campaign to eradicate vario-
la might be organised and run. Plans that were
presented as a good idea by one group of WHO
workers at one regional office were almost rou-
tinely challenged both within their organisation
and outside. Criticism from within other region-
al offices was often quite strident, as officials
based therein made it a point to underline the
need to develop locally specific plans. And as the
scope of what was defined as constituting the ‘lo-
cality’ expanded from government structures lo-
cated within specific national capitals to the po-
litical and social constituencies of the districts,
sub-divisions and villages within whose admin-
istrative confines immunisation policies were ac-
tually going to unfold, the disagreements within
the complexity of WHO structures became even
more marked.
The South Asian subcontinent, which was the
focus of the global eradication programme in the
late 1960s and the 1970s due to the high incidence
of variola in the region, was a good case in point.
WHO officials in touch with representatives of
the Indian, Pakistani, Nepali, Sri Lankan, Bhu-
tanese, Burmese and, later, Bangladeshi national
governments – and, therefore, keenly aware of
the many expectations and tensions within those
multi-faceted formations – refused to blindly
accept orders relating to the blanket implemen-
tation of specific immunisation strategies and
vaccine usage patterns coming in from Geneva.
Strikingly, suggestions from the HQ were fre-
quently queried and discussions were held within
the regional offices about how the dictates from
Geneva might be restructured to best meet a host
of local needs; these trends were very noticeable
within the Eastern Mediterranean Regional Of-
fice (EMRO) that dealt with Pakistan and the
South East Asian Regional Office (SEARO), which
was charged with the task of working with the
other sub-continental governments (including
Bangladesh after 1971). An assessment of all such
discussions, which is best done through a study
of unpublished telegrams, letters and reports
available in the various WHO archives, reveals
that officials located within different levels and
departments of the regional offices continued to
hold disparate views right till global smallpox
eradication was formally certified.
As is to be expected, the prevalence of numer-
ous ideas about how work ought to be carried
out within SEARO and EMRO influenced the
many ways in which eradication policies were
implemented. Like the WHO HQ in Geneva, the
regional offices were not monolithic bodies. Some
officials were more enthusiastic than others about
the goal of variola eradication, and divergences
in policy implementation were further encour-
aged by the fact that Regional Directors remained
keen to advertise their autonomy by seeking to
reconfigure guidelines received from the HQ, usu-
ally on the basis of their own understanding of
local requirements. Such variation in bureaucratic
support within the WHO was frequently identi-
fied in internal, unpublished documents as a sig-
nificant impediment to the smooth running of
the overall programme. This helps explain why
SEARO structures were reorganised in the 1970s,
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clearly in an effort to ensure smoother and direct
interactions between the Smallpox Eradication
Unit headed by Donald Henderson in Geneva and
the field officers in the region. Notably, this took
the form of the setting up a unit in New Delhi,
within the SEARO establishment, which was put
in Nicole Grasset’s charge; this body was made
directly answerable to Henderson and his team
and also given access to special funds donated by
a variety of funding agencies (the Swedish Inter-
national Development Agency was a major con-
tributor towards the costs of the so-called inten-
sified phase of activity in India and Bangladesh
from 1973 onwards). The aim, it appears, was to
counteract the then SEARO Regional Director’s
opposition to the way the smallpox programme
was being run in South Asia, and develop a rela-
tively independent taskforce drawn from a vari-
ety of WHO-affiliated workers, both internation-
al and South Asian.
This reorganisation of personnel helped in
other ways as well. For example, as noted in the
previous section, it allowed for the inflow of a
miscellany of ideas from the field about how to
adapt work effectively to a variety of local condi-
tions. Placed in the hands of Geneva- and New
Delhi-based managers who were willing to avoid
the strict top-down imposition of centrally dic-
tated policies, to negotiate with the target popu-
lation, and, not least, to adapt work to assuage
local concerns and innovate in relation to the
running of the so-called search and containment
strategies that were central to the campaigns of
the 1970s, such input was invaluable. Indeed, it
allowed teams of international and local work-
ers, who were generally mobilised in groups con-
taining personnel of various nationalities (the
Indian government insisted on such an arrange-
ment before allowing foreign epidemiologists to
work in the country), to respond quickly to a
diversity of local crises and social, political and
economic needs. That the personnel were spared
the need to get endless bureaucratic clearances
for finances controlled by the Regional Director
and national governments helped enormously,
as it saved valuable time and allowed for greater
flexibility.
This is not to say that opposition, from with-
in WHO agencies and complex national political
frameworks, disappeared completely over time.
Indeed, pockets of often intense hostility remained
in a situation where the Regional Directors re-
tained powerful political alliances within and
across national borders; this was compounded
by the significant power held by critics within
South Asian national, provincial and district gov-
ernments and their various departments, as well
as the doubts about the efficacy of vaccination
harboured by some sections of society. Striking-
ly, not all public health and medical officials were
supportive of smallpox eradication, as many con-
sidered the goal an impossible one and, there-
fore, a misguided waste of scarce resources. Ad-
ministrative bottlenecks frequently resulted, as
plans suggested by the WHO’s smallpox eradi-
cation units in Geneva and New Delhi were ques-
tioned and, sometimes, blocked within different
levels of South Asian administration. These trends
threw up vital challenges in a situation where
WHO officials had varying levels of access to dif-
ferent national territories; problems that, it has
to be noted, could only be overcome through
sustained negotiations with politicians and bu-
reaucrats of all ranks (including members of the
political opposition), as well as members of tar-
get population. As mentioned earlier, internation-
al workers could not just fly into the national
capitals and then disperse as they wished. In all
cases, they required clearance from a country’s
federal authority for entry and work, with special
paperwork being additionally required for visits
to politically sensitive enclaves (India’s North
Eastern Frontier Area, as this region near Chi-
nese borders was then designated, was a case in
point, as was the highly disturbed Indo-Bang-
ladeshi border in the 1970s).
The result, therefore, was a complex patch-
work of distinct plans and patterns of work, in a
multiplicity of urban and rural areas. These co-
existed uneasily and sometimes openly came into
conflict, due to the influence of a variety of ad-
ministrative, economic and social factors; situa-
tions that required careful resolution through
sensitive diplomatic negotiations carried out by
WHO workers in association with their allies in
national and local government. Force was some-
times used to counter opposition to vaccinations
associated to search and containment regimes,
but these were exceptions rather than the norm.
Once again, these initiatives could not be carried
out by WHO personnel in isolation, as the dan-
ger of a violent social and political backlash were
acute – unpublished WHO and government cor-
respondence regarding campaigns of forcible
immunisation suggests careful planning and syn-
chronisation of efforts between organisational
employees, South Asian politicians of all ranks
and hues, and, not least, national and local mili-
tary, paramilitary and police forces (links that
were almost university downplayed, by all in-
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volved, once smallpox eradication had been
achieved). It was a combination of all these initi-
atives that allowed for the eradication of small-
pox in South Asia, which was ultimately crucial
to the ultimate removal of the disease globally.
Concluding comments
The global eradication of smallpox is, by any
measure, an enormous achievement. To recogn-
ise that this goal was reached in the face of tre-
mendous difficulties, often emanating from with-
in the confines of all the organisations involved
in the programme, does not detract from that
accomplishment. However, it does serve as a re-
minder that scholars should avoid being swept
away by the heroic narratives that tend to pre-
dominate in official histories prepared after the
certification of eradication24-26.Historians need to
be equally careful about being over-reliant on
reports published during the programme’s earli-
er stages, as these tend only to offer the views of
a few people, who hoped, usually in vain, that
their recommendations would implemented as
policy in the field. Ground realities, as this article
attempts to show, were always significantly more
intricate. And this complexity can only really be
revealed by a careful analysis of unpublished pa-
pers dealing with the day to day discussions about
policy, which are useful precisely because they
reveal the views and actions of the thousands of
field managers and health workers who contrib-
uted to smallpox eradication; their ability to study
and adapt to a plethora of local conditions was
crucial to the ultimate result and, therefore, mer-
its recognition.
Assessing the intellectual, political and social
agendas of a handful of senior WHO officials is
fine as long as we do not end up assuming that
everyone else associated to it was devoid of intel-
lect, and the ability to make a difference in the
design and implementation of policy. The views
of WHO Directors General, their advisors and
overall heads of disease control programmes are
undoubtedly important. Yet, it is important to
remember that their views were neither static nor
able to dictate the day to day running of a highly
complex organisation; at the same time, it would
be foolhardy for the historian seeking to study
the complex interplay between global, regional,
national and local forces to ignore the compli-
cated political networks that different constitu-
ents of the WHO had to contend with on a daily
basis, often through the offices of staff employed
locally on a variety of short-term contracts.
The attempt here is to emphasise the differ-
ence between theory and practice; the need to dis-
tinguish between the official rhetoric from the
WHO HQ and regional offices, and the nature of
work actually carried out in a variety of field sit-
uations, with the active assistance of a wide range
of health workers, is of paramount importance.
This would allow the preparation of more round-
ed histories of health campaigns run of a global
scale, which were – and continue to be – reliant
on the assistance provided by numerous local
political and social actors. And unlike the thinly
researched and jargon filled analyses of the
thoughts and actions of a few senior organisa-
tional personnel, a thorough assessment of the
intricacies of global health organisations and their
links to national and local governments can ac-
tually provide useful insights into the manage-
ment of current health programmes. Apart from
anything else, the careful examination of policy
implementation would suggest that the acute dif-
ferences between vertical and horizontal health
programmes, which analysts dependent on pub-
lished policy assertions regularly allude to, are
far less marked than assumed. Indeed, local in-
frastructural exigencies and field experiences of-
ten forced developments that blurred the lines
between preventive and curative medicine; an
important point to remember when the WHO
HQ’s renewed emphasis on the worldwide re-
generation of the structures of primary health-
care is stoking interesting discussions, both within
and outside the organisation, about their ability
to bring about meaningful changes in develop-
ing, less developed and developed countries.
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